Naval War College Review
Volume 70
Number 4 Autumn

Article 19

2017

Hunters and Killers, Vol. 2, Anti-submarine Warfare
from 1943
Sean Sullivan
Norman Polmar
Edward Whitman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Sullivan, Sean; Polmar, Norman; and Whitman, Edward (2017) "Hunters and Killers, Vol. 2, Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943,"
Naval War College Review: Vol. 70 : No. 4 , Article 19.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss4/19

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

154

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Sullivan et al.: Hunters and Killers, Vol. 2, Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943

Prussia created by Frederick the Great
and his father Frederick William II” (p.
16) undermine the author’s credibility.
Austria’s Hofkriegsrat was not “also
known as the Aulic Council” (p. 24);
they were very different entities.
Maps are an issue as well. The maps in
this book would have been considered
archaic fifty years ago; today they are
abominable and practically illegible—
a magnifying glass might be of some
assistance. Any operational study
depends on good maps to help the
reader understand the course of the
campaigns, but this reviewer gave up
on trying to use this book’s maps.
It is difficult to state where this book
fits in the massive literature on the
Napoleonic Wars. This study can be seen
as an extension of Robert M. Epstein’s
1994 work Napoleon’s Last Victory and
the Emergence of Modern War. Kuehn
does accomplish his stated goal of
describing the Napoleonic “campaigns,
armies, and leaders using the lens of
operational art” (p. 10). However, the
descriptions of the campaigns are not
detailed enough for any but a Napoleonic Wars expert to grasp the points that
Kuehn is trying to make. He admits that
some will object to his use of twentiethcentury military theory to explain
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
events (p. xi). Kuehn does have moments
of brilliance, especially in the chapters
on the evolution of the operational art
and the naval duel, as well as the short
paragraphs he employs to summarize
his chapters, but in the end an analysis
based on outdated scholarship provides
a weak foundation that jeopardizes
the stability of the entire structure.
MICHAEL V. LEGGIERE
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Hunters and Killers, by Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman. Vol. 2, Anti-submarine Warfare
from 1943. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2016. 272 pages. $49.95.

Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 is
the second volume in a comprehensive
history of the impact of the submarine
on maritime warfare. Engaging their
significant expertise in the history of
naval warfare and military technology
research and development, authors
Norman Polmar and Edward Whitman chronicle the development and
employment of the submarine as a
weapon of war at sea and the resulting response by navies to counter
the effectiveness of the submarine
through antisubmarine warfare (ASW).
This book examines submarine and
antisubmarine technology, tactics, and
doctrine chronologically, commencing
with World War II submarine operations
in the Atlantic and Pacific and culminating with twenty-first-century ASW
concepts and contemporary issues.
This history captures the asymmetry
between the submarine and antisubmarine warfare as these two forms of
maritime warfare competed for tactical
and operational superiority. The book
discusses contributions the science and
technology community made to ASW,
as well as the actions of operational
and tactical innovators. The scientists
and innovators collectively developed
ASW capabilities that reignited further
competition between the submarine
and the ASW operator. The book’s
chronological approach studies the
pace and trajectory of evolutionary and
revolutionary changes in submarine
operations and antisubmarine warfare by
explaining the tactical and operational
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challenges facing submarines and ASW
forces. The authors then describe and
assess the subsequent reactions of navies
to mitigate or eliminate each advantage.
The book stimulates the reader to assess
retrospectively the inflection points at
which the hunters became the hunted.
Of particular value is the authors’
examination of antisubmarine warfare
across the broad spectrum of ASW
methods, technology, doctrine, and
tactics. Anti-submarine Warfare from
1943 includes study of the contributions
to antisubmarine warfare made by
ships, submarines, and aircraft, but also
the maturing science and technologies
that enabled other forms of ASW. For
example, the book explains the development and employment of acoustic
systems by describing the development
and use of active and passive shipborne,
air, and fixed sonar systems. In addition,
the authors examine the impact on ASW
of nonacoustic methods, illuminating
the important contributions made by
espionage, cryptographic systems and
communication intercepts, electromagnetic effects, infrared and laser
systems, and subsurface wake detection.
In the first four chapters of Antisubmarine Warfare from 1943, the
authors evaluate submarine warfare
and antisubmarine warfare during
World War II in the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. Numerous engagements
are detailed describing the tactical
contributions of World War II ASW
ships, aircraft, and submarines to U.S.
and Allied efforts to wrest the advantage
away from the Axis submarine force.
The book captures the multidomain approach to the period’s ASW operations.
Not surprisingly in a study of antisubmarine warfare after World War II, five
chapters of the book identify and analyze
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Cold War influences on submarine
operations and antisubmarine warfare.
This history captures the nature and
intensity of the U.S.-USSR Cold War
ASW competition. That competition is
placed in the context of national military
strategies, technological developments,
operational doctrines, and tactics. These
chapters reflect on submarine and
antisubmarine warfare during a long
period of not-quite-war, but definitely
not peace, in the security environment.
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943 is a
holistic study of antisubmarine warfare
that provides an opportunity to think
critically about history’s most impactful
developments in submarine warfare
and ASW operations. Readers might
expect the authors to engage their expert
knowledge of ASW history to assess
which events or developments in antisubmarine warfare were most impactful
in the competitive and dynamic relationship between the submarine and ASW
forces, but the authors allow readers to
develop their own assessments and judge
the short-term and enduring significance of ASW technological and tactical
initiatives and developments over the
history of antisubmarine warfare.
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943
will be of great interest to readers with
tactical and technical ASW experience.
For an ASW expert, the book offers the
opportunity to reflect on previously
obtained knowledge and experience and
holistically reflect on antisubmarine
warfare and submarine operations across
the broad spectrum of ASW concepts.
For the ASW novice, this book provides
historical perspective on and context
for decades of ASW developments. An
appealing feature of this book is that
the authors eliminate the incredibly
detailed technical parameters that can
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dominate any discussion or assessment
of ASW operations. For the reader
seeking that type of detail, the book’s
extensive footnotes and bibliography
are valuable sources for research on
several types of technical information, tactics, and historical events.
Anti-submarine Warfare from 1943
stimulates the reader to think critically
about the trends and inflection points
in the lethal relationship between the
submarine and ASW operations.
SEAN SULLIVAN

Honor before Glory: The Epic World War II Story
of the Japanese-American GIs Who Rescued the
Lost Battalion, by Scott McGaugh. Boston: Da
Capo, 2016. 304 pages. $25.99.

What is as stirring as a tale of a “lost
battalion”? The story elements are
simple. A hard-fighting group of
American soldiers gets out in front
of advancing troops and eventually is
surrounded by the enemy. A prolonged
fight ensues as the battalion fights
for its life, while other U.S. and allied
forces mount repeated attempts to find
and then rescue the lost battalion.
Perhaps the most famous of all U.S. lost
battalions was a force of slightly more
than 550 men, primarily from the 308th
Battalion of the 77th Division, during
the Meuse-Argonne offensive of October
1918. Low on food, water, and other supplies, the battalion withstood repeated
German attacks for six days. When
finally “rescued,” the battalion had
only 194 men. On relief of the 308th,
the battalion’s commander, a bespectacled major from Wisconsin named
Charles Whittlesey, was promoted
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immediately and soon after received
the Congressional Medal of Honor.
In World War II, the title of “the lost
battalion” was worn by the 1st Battalion,
141st Infantry Regiment of the Army’s
36th Infantry Division. The 141st was
a Texas National Guard outfit and, like
the 308th twenty-six years earlier, it had
its brush with fame during a wet and
cold October in France. On October 23,
1944, the 141st was ordered to advance
into the Vosges Mountains. Members
of the 141st were assured that a “strong
force” would follow them. The terrain
was steep and heavily forested, with but
a single logging road. The Germans,
with their usual tenacity and competent
generalship, conducted a tenacious
defense over ground they knew well.
The battalion made good progress on
the 23rd, advancing four miles along
the logging road, and the advance
continued the next day; the battalion
reached its objective after covering
six more miles. Shortly afterward the
Germans conducted a heavy artillery
bombardment. An effort was made to
reinforce the battalion with light tanks
and artillery, but it failed owing to the
dense forest. By dusk, the 1st Battalion
was surrounded—cut off from resupply,
medical aid, and reinforcements. If not
relieved, destruction by or surrender
to the Germans appeared inevitable.
Major General John Dahlquist, commanding the 36th Division, set about
organizing a relief. He chose the 442nd
Regimental Combat Team to serve as
his primary assault force. Although
the 442nd troops had just been taken
off the line for some well-deserved
rest and resupply, their reputation as
highly competent assault troops was
a major factor in Dahlquist’s decision.
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